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ABSTRACT
This paper formalizes a sociological phenomenon entitled 'acting white'. The key idea is that
individuals face a tension between signaling their type to the outside labor market and signaling their
type to a peer group: signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer rejection. We
prove three basic results: (1) there exists no equilibria in which all types of individuals adopt distinct
educational investment levels; (2) when individuals are not too patient, all equilibria satisfying a
standard refinement involve a binary partition of the type space in which all types accepted by the
group pool on a common low education level and all types rejected by the group separate at
distinctly higher levels of education with correspondingly higher wages; and (3) when individuals
are very patient, there is an increase in the variation of education levels within the group and an
increase in the variance of types deemed acceptable by the group. The more those involved discount
the future, the more salient peer pressure becomes and the more homogenous groups become.
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rfryer@fas.harvard.eduOf all the obstacles to success that inner city youth face, the most surprising—and discouraging—
may be those erected by their own peers... Many teenagers have come to equate black identity
with alienation and indiﬀerence. “I use to go home and cry,” says Tachelle Ross, 18, a senior at
Oberlin High School in Ohio. “They called me white. I don’t know why. ‘I’d say, I am as black
as you are.” Promising black students are ridiculed for speaking standard English, showing an
interest in ballet or theater, having white friends, or joining activities other than sports...
Honor students may be rebuked for even showing up for class on time. The pattern of abuse is
a distinctive variation on the nerd bashing that almost all bright, ambitious students—no matter
the color—face at some point in their lives. The anti-achievement ethic championed by some black
youngsters declares formal education useless; those who disagree and study hard face isolation,
scorn and violence. While educators have recognized the existence of an anti-achievement culture
for at least a decade, it has only recently emerged as a dominant theme among the troubles facing
urban schools...
Social success depends partly on academic failure; safety and acceptance lie in rejecting the
traditional paths to self-improvement.
–— “The Hidden Hurdle,” Time, March 16, 1992
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Like the Mississippi river divides the United States, so too does the question of race and racial inequality.
As W.E.B. Du Bois so eloquently stated, “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-
line.” Following in the path laid out by Du Bois, many scholars in many ﬁelds have brought their intellectual
energies to bear on the causes of racial disparities.
One element of this divide manifests itself in academic achievement (as measured by standardized test
scores, GPA, and the like) between minorities and non-minorities. It has been well documented in the em-
pirical social science literatures that after controlling for a potpourri of common explanatory variables, there
still remains a substantial achievement gap between blacks and whites (Jencks and Phillips, 1998). Gaining
a better understanding of the underlying causes of the gap is a question of great importance1. Current expla-
nations range from the genetic inferiority of minorities (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994 and Jensen, 1998) to
diﬀerences in neighborhoods and environment (Brooks-Gunn and Duncan, 1997). Proponents of the genetics
argument contend that blacks are predisposed, ap r i o r i , to poor performance as compared to their white
counterparts, due solely to innate biological diﬀerences between the races2. This argument, however, runs in
1To this eﬀect, Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips write “Reducing the black-white test score gap would do more to
promote racial equality than any other strategy that commands broad political support.”
2Rushton (2000) has a similar view. He proposes that there exists genetic comparative advantages betwen diﬀerent races.
For example, Kenyans are predisposed to be better runners and Russians better mathematicians.
2direct conﬂict with the substantial amount of biological evidence that fails to pin any diﬀerence in the bio-
logical construct of human beings to race (Olson, 2002). Further, new evidence reported in Fryer and Levitt
(2002) ﬁnds that the black-white achievement gap is essentially zero when kids enter school, after controlling
for a parsimonious set of controls. On the other hand, the environmental proponents suppose that blacks
are simply in diﬀerent environments, as compared to whites, (ﬁnancially, socially, etc.) and the residual gap
is due to the substantial diﬀerence in unobservable environmental or neighborhood eﬀects (with regards to
limitations of the data). This argument, however, does not account for the empirical observation that blacks
still do substantially worse than whites in middle class suburban neighborhoods, where presumably the social
and ﬁnancial constructs are very similar (Ferguson, 2001). Thus, we are left with an important paradox.
First, if genetics is the answer, then where are the biological diﬀerences that are tied to race? Second, if it is
purely the environment, then why are blacks and whites in the same “privileged” environments performing
diﬀerently? The appropriate public policy choice to address the achievement gap depends critically on the
underlying explanation.
This paper seeks to resolve the paradox by formalizing a phenomenon entitled ‘acting white’. ‘Acting
white’ is a situation that is believed to manifest itself in the United States within black and Hispanic
neighborhoods. It suggests that adolescents within these neighborhoods can have tremendous disincentives
to invest in particular behaviors (i.e. education, ballet, etc.) due to the fact that they may be deemed as a
person who is trying to act like a white person (a.k.a. “selling-out”)3. Such a label, in some neighborhoods,
can carry penalties that range from being deemed a social outcast, to being beaten or killed4. In essence, the
need or desire to be accepted by one’s peers leads individuals to behave in ways they would otherwise avoid.
Similar arguments motivate recent work by Akerlof (1997) and Akerlof and Kranton (1999) on the economic
implications of social conformism and cultural “identity”. Inter alia, these authors survey a litany of works,
both academic and autobiographical, testifying to the tension many individuals of a minority culture feel
between doing what is expected to remain accepted by their peers or social group (be it predicated on race,
ethnicity or gender), and doing what is expected to succeed in a world dominated by those in the majority
culture.
While the ‘acting white’ hypothesis may explain sub par academic performance in low-income black
neighborhoods, one potential puzzle is the black middle-class. It is well documented that blacks in middle
class neighborhoods are not achieving, academically, at the same rate as their white counter parts (Pattillo-
McCoy, 1999). This has puzzled many environmental proponents, since presumably, blacks and whites in
these neighborhoods have similar environmental conditions. To understand this, one has to consider the
impact of racial segregation in housing. Due to a peculiar history, the black middle class are much more
3In aﬄuent neighborhoods, blacks and Hispanics can endure the same litmus test; once confronted by another individual
w i t h i nt h e i rs a m er a c ew h ow a n t st ok n o ww h yt h e ya r ea c t i n gi nac e r t a i nw a y .M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, blacks in suburban schools
may face the same dis-incentives, just less often (see Pertroni and Hirsch, 1970 and Patillo-McCoy, 1999).
4This is not an exaggeration. In Greenville, South Carolina, two adolescants were convicted of “second degree lynching”
after attempting to hang a peer they accused of ‘acting white.’ There is no cite for this, as it was handled in juvenile court and
the records are sealed. Sam Stillwell represented the defendant.
3likely to live in neighborhoods that border poor black neighborhoods5. Jargowsky and Bane (1991) show
that black middle class neighborhoods are much more likely to create a buﬀer zone between the black poor
and white non poor. Massey and Denton (1993) report that blacks with college educations have more than
a 20 percent chance of coming in contact in their neighborhood with someone receiving welfare, whereas
college-educated whites have an 8 percent chance. This pattern was repeated for interaction with blue-collar
workers, high school drop-outs, and the unemployed.
The central underlying idea of ‘acting white,’ is that individuals face a tension between signaling their
type to the outside labor market and signaling their type to a peer group: signals that induce high wages can
be signals that induce peer rejection. It is important to emphasize at the outset that, in the model, ﬁrms
are assumed to have no interest in any employee’s group membership, and groups are assumed not to have
any basic preference over whether a potential member is employed or wealthy6. Consequently, there is no
intrinsic conﬂict built into the model between individuals being highly educated and employed, and being
members of a group. At the same time, other things equal, all types strictly prefer to be accepted rather
than rejected by their peer group; the group, however, is concerned only to accept those individuals who
will be reliable group members in that they can be depended upon to support the group in diﬃcult times.
Examples of this sort of reliability are not hard to ﬁnd; they range from gang members who can be trusted
not to betray other members when subjected to police investigation, to residents of a community who can
b er e l i e du p o nt oi n v e s tt h et i m ea n de ﬀort to help their neighbors when they are in need (see Anderson,
1999, for more detailed examples). An important characteristic of these and many other examples, one that
in large part deﬁnes what it is to be a member of social group rather than a strictly economic market, is
that the costs of membership are in terms of personal time and eﬀort, not money per se.
Although the assumption that all individuals prefer to be accepted by their peers is taken as primitive
(and predicated on the sociological and psychological evidence that such preferences exist and are widespread
(Asch, 1952)), the operationalization of which types constitute reliable group members is endogenous to the
model. This turns out to be far from a single type, and gives rise naturally to a notion of peer pressure. The
principal result is an existence and characterization of a speciﬁc class of equilibria, central to the canonic
job signaling literature initiated by Spence (1974). Unlike in the canonic model where this class consists
exclusively of equilibria in which all types invest in distinct levels of education (i.e. separate) and so attract
distinct wages, in the present model there exist no separating equilibria. Instead, equilibria in the class
comprise a set of types all of whom choose the same low education level (i.e. pool) while the remaining types
separate, with the lowest separating type making a signiﬁcantly higher investment in education and earning
a correspondingly higher wage than those adopting the pooling investment. The resulting binary partition
of types corresponds to those accepted by their peers (the pooling types) and those rejected (the separating
types). And it is worth emphasizing that nothing is built into the model that requires accepted types to
adopt a common educational investment; it is an equilibrium outcome. On the other hand, the speciﬁcc l a s s
5See Pattillo-McCoy (1999), chapter 2, for a nice discussion on the evolution of the black middle class.
6This is an important point of departure from the standard explanations in the sociology and anthropolgy literatures.
4of equilibria is empty when individuals value the future suﬃciently highly. In this case, a natural extension
of the original class of equilibria leads to some variation in the education investment choices among those
accepted by the peer group and a simultaneous increase in the variance of types deemed acceptable. Inter
alia, therefore, the model supports some comparative statics on group composition and intra-group behavior
as functions of individuals’ discount factors.
Although our model is the ﬁrst attempt at incorporating ‘acting white’ into a formal rational choice
framework7, one can discern a hint of the ‘acting white’ problem in some of the early writings of Franklin
E. Frazier (1957). More recently, anthropologists Signithia Fordham and John Ogbu (1986) attempt to
explain the ‘acting white’ phenomenon by, what we will refer to as, the oppositional culture hypothesis.
Fordham and Ogbu (1986) posit that the oppositional culture frame of reference is applied by minorities
in selective situations. From their perspective, the target areas appear to be those traditionally deﬁned as
prerogatives of white Americans, both by white people themselves and by minorities. This hypothesis states
that the observed disparity between blacks and whites stems from the following factors: (1) white people
provide them with inferior schooling and treat them diﬀerently in school; (2) by imposing a job ceiling, white
people fail to reward them adequately for their academic achievement in adult life; and (3) black Americans
develop coping devices which, in turn, further limit their striving for academic success. In other words, a
major reason that black students do not do well in school is that they experience inordinate ambivalence
and aﬀective dissonance in regard to academic eﬀort and success. Fordham and Ogbu propose that this
problem arose partly because white Americans traditionally refused to acknowledge that black Americans
were capable of intellectual achievement, and partly because black Americans subsequently began to doubt
their own intellectual ability, began to deﬁne academic success as white people’s prerogative, and began to
discourage their peers, perhaps unconsciously, from emulating white people in academic striving (i.e. ‘acting
white’).8
There have been several studies that fail to ﬁnd empirical justiﬁcation for an oppositional culture (Cook
and Ludwig 1998; Ainworth-Darnell and Downey 1998; and Ferguson 2001). Cook and Ludwig’s work ask
7Fryer (2003) develops a more general model of the tension between investments in (local) cultural and (global) human
capital, of which ‘acting white’ can be a consequence.
8Generally, there are large literatures concerning group inﬂuences on individual decision-making in sociology and social
psychology, yet eﬀorts to develop more formal models addressing how such inﬂuences aﬀect economic decisions in general, let
alone with regard to education and investment in human capital, are relatively new. And within the formal literature, most
of the work is devoted to understanding the economic implications of (more or less) given social norms. Akerlof (1976, 1980)
are early examples on how given norms of conformity and fairness inﬂuence labour market behaviour and collective action.
Recent contributions beyond those cited earlier include Bernheim (1994), who provides an elegant signaling model in which
both conformism and ‘deviant’ behaviours arise endogenously in equilibrium; Lindbeck and Weibull (1999) look at a political
economy model of redistributive taxation and labour supply in which the tax-rate and the intensity to which ‘living oﬀ one’s
work’ is a signiﬁcant social norm are endogenous; Cole et al (1992) and contributions to a special issue of the J o u r n a lo fP u b l i c
Economics (1998) devoted to norms and status explore various models of social interaction and economic behaviour (see also
Kandori, 1992). While much of this literature bears in some way on the issue here, none of it directly considers the role of peer
pressure on human capital formation.
5three critical questions: (1) Do African-American adolescents report greater alienation from school than
non-Hispanic whites? (2) Does academic success lead to social ostracism among black adolescents? (3)
Do the social costs or beneﬁts of academic success diﬀer by race? For each question, their answer based
on analysis of nationally representative data is, “apparently not.” Further, sociologists Ainworth-Darnell
and Downey analyzed the same national data and came to essentially similar conclusions. However, their
ﬁndings support the additional hypothesis that blacks have more problems than whites in a category they call
“skills, habits and styles.” They ﬁnd that variables in this category, as distinct from oppositional attitudes
about achievement, help in a small way to explain the achievement gap in the data that they analyzed.
One important contribution in this literature is Ferguson (2001). In a beautifully detailed investigation of
the academic achievement disparities within an integrated school in Shaker Heights, Ohio, he also suggests
that the oppositional culture hypothesis is misplaced, though his argument is more subtle. He believes that
the opposition, if any, is not directed towards whites speciﬁcally as individuals; however, the opposition is
directed toward white supremacy as an ideal—in which stigmas are kept alive and from which insinuations of
black inferiority can persist. Black collective identity then serves as a mechanism of mutual validation and
shields oﬀ the rumors of genetic inferiority.
Despite the evidence against the oppositional culture hypothesis, there are some objections, two of which
are particularly germane here. First, the works by Cook and Ludwig (1998), Ainworth-Darnell and Downey
(1998), and Ferguson (2001), are not direct tests of the oppositional culture hypothesis. Fordham and Ogbu
(1986) analyze an inner city near Washington D.C. Capital High, the ﬁctitious name given to the high school
where the ethnographic data was collected, is a predominantly black high school (99%) in a black low income
neighborhood. The others, however, use either nationally representative samples or data from one integrated
high school in Ohio. In other words, if anything, the samples claiming to rebuke the oppositional culture
hypothesis can do so only in so far as they cast doubt on the external validity of Fordham and Ogbu’s ﬁeld
work. Whether the minority students in Capital high (where the ethnographic data was collected) or any
other high school limit their academic pursuits because of the fear of ‘acting white’, we don’t know9.S e c o n d ,
there is a tremendous amount of anecdotal evidence that the fear of ‘acting white’ is a serious debilitator for
minority youth. Indeed, a search of major newspapers yields over seventy articles since 1985 on the eﬀects
of ‘acting white.’ In June of 1999, the ABC 20/20 News Hour aired a segment on the topic of ‘acting white’
as it applies among black high school students. The setting was a racially mixed high school in Wisconsin
where reporter Charles Gibson interviewed students who had been accused of ‘acting white’ and others who
had made the accusations. When Gibson suggested to a young man that trying to hold others back from
reaching their full potential was not a good thing to do, one student’s response was, “Yeah, but they were
kickin’ their old friends to the side for new friends, and that’s not right either.” A young woman in a similar
exchange retorted, “Yeah, I’m gonna call you actin’ white if you act like you think you’re better than me.”
9In another example, Suskind (1998) reports of the trials and tribulations of Cedric Jennings, a student in one of the most
blighted high schools in inner-city Washington, D.C. The book begins with Cedric hiding in the chemistry lab, trying to escape
the “cat calls” of “nerd” and “whitey” he will endure at the schools award assembly—which honors academic achievement.
6Another young man, now a record producer and rap recording artist, had gone away to Exeter, the elite
private preparatory school, and come back dressing and speaking diﬀerently from when he left. He was
accused of acting white. His interpretation of why former friends in the community were a little “put oﬀ”
or “taken aback,” was not that they resented his success. Instead, his interpretation was sensitive to their
concern that he might be trying to escape the stigma. He said they wondered if he had “sold out” to the
Other part of society that looked down on people like themselves. He responded by ﬁnding ways to share
his success and, “By letting them know that I’m not ashamed. I can still speak slang. I can still rap, even.”
The above rhetoric seems intuitive. It does not need the oppositional culture assumption to validate the
behavior. Yet, it clearly suggests, as we assume in the formal model, that blacks do not really care about
one’s perceived success, as long as it does not conﬂict with their “loyalty” towards the black community.
This is an extremely important, subtle, point that is also evident in the Fordham (1991) ethnography.
2M o d e l
There are an inﬁnite number of discrete time periods, indexed t =0 ,1,2,.... The initial period, t =0 ,i s
distinguished as the “school years”; periods t>0 are collectively referred to as the “post-school years”. In
principle, three sorts of agent interact in each period: individuals, ﬁrms and a (suitably anthropomorphized)
peer group. We begin with a detailed description of the basic building blocks of our model.
A. The Basic Building Blocks
Individuals An individual’s abilities (types) are private information to the individual and chosen
by Nature at the start of the school years according to a smooth common knowledge c.d.f. F with density
having support [0,θ), θ ﬁnite. Types, once chosen, are ﬁxed over time. With some abuse of terminology,
where there is no ambiguity, we shall refer to an individual of type θ simply as “individual θ”. In addition
to a type, an individual is endowed with one unit of eﬀort in each period. In each period t, the individual
chooses how to allocate his or her endowment of eﬀort; any eﬀort level expended on any activity in a period
is commonly observable and eﬀort is nonstorable.10
In the initial period t =0 , the “school years”, individual θ allocates eﬀort between leisure and a once-and-
for-all investment in education. Since education and eﬀort expended on acquiring education are identiﬁed
without loss of generality here, let s ∈ [0,1] denote the level of education acquired, or input of individual
eﬀort to education expended, in the school years. Although the output of education for any level of eﬀort
is independent of an individual’s type, the cost of eﬀort so expended is not. In addition to the direct
opportunity cost of eﬀort used for education in the school years, assume there is a further cost of any
10It is perhaps more natural to think of an individual allocating time, rather than observable eﬀort. The use of the eﬀort
terminology, however, is to avoid the possibility of any notational confusion between time periods and an individual’s allocation
of time within any period.
7educational investment to individual θ, c(s,θ) ≥ 0. As in the canonical signaling literature, the cost function
c is assumed to satisfy





where subscripts denote partial derivatives in the usual way. Thus eﬀort is costly for all types but higher
types ﬁnd it less costly to acquire any given level of education. At the end of the school years, an individ-
ual’s education level is ﬁxed and competitive bidding between ﬁrms leads to post-school employment at an
endogenously determined per period wage, w ≥ 0.
At the start of any period t ≥ 1, individual θ may or may not be an accepted member of her peer group.
If θ is not such an accepted member then she consumes one unit of leisure and her given wage; on the other
hand, if is θ an accepted member of the group then θ may face a period t eﬀort allocation problem.11
Let individual θ be an accepted member of the peer group for period t ≥ 1. Membership is valued
because, other things equal, leisure time spent in the group is valued more highly than leisure time spent
outside the group. Group membership, however, involves some costs on occasion. Speciﬁcally, while no
direct contribution is required of any individual accepted by the group in the school years, at the start of
each subsequent period t =1 ,2,..., θ may or may not be required to make a contribution to the group’s
well-being. We assume that such contributions are observable and that their costs to an individual are
measured in terms of eﬀort. Suppose that in any period t>0, Nature chooses a required contribution
κt ∈ {0,k} from the individual to the group, 0 <k<1; for future reference, let π ∈ (0,1) be the (date
invariant) probability that κt =0 .12 The cost to an individual θ of making a contribution k is assumed to
depend on the individual’s type. The cost to θ of making a contribution k, measured in terms of eﬀort, is
θk,s oh i g h e rt y p e sﬁnd it more onerous to comply than lower types and any type θ>1/k is unable to fulﬁll
ad e m a n dt oc o n t r i b u t ek (throughout, assume θ>1/k). The eﬀort allocation problem in period t for an
individual member of the peer group, therefore, is on whether or not to contribute to the group if called
upon do so in that period.
For any t ≥ 0,l e tat ∈ {0,1} denote whether the individual is rejected (at =0 ) or accepted (at =1 )b y
his or her peer group in t,a n dl e tv(lt|at) be the individual’s period t payoﬀ from leisure lt ∈ [0,1].T h e n
given the individual’s type θ and school year education decision, s ∈ [0,1], θ’s period t =0payoﬀ is,
v(1 − s|a0) − c(s,θ). (2)
Assume v(l|·) twice diﬀerentiable concave increasing in l on (0,1). Further assume that having no leisure at
all is worthless irrespective of group acceptance, and that both total and marginal values from consuming
11Adding a discrete eﬀo r tc o s tf o rs h o w i n gu pt ow o r ki na n yp e r i o da n da s s u m i n gﬁrms ﬁre an employee who ever fails to
show up, leaves the following analysis unaﬀected. However, it turns out that in equilibrium no individual earning a strictly
positive wage ever fails to show up for work.
12As suggested in the Introduction, an interpretation of such contributions here is in terms of helping out in diﬃcult times,
where these fall upon the group or the average group member with frequency 1 − π. And while costs might then be more
naturally modeled as continuous variables, doing so adds little further insight.
8any strictly positive amount leisure are greater as an accepted group member than otherwise: formally,
v(0|1) = v(0|0) = 0 and, for all l>0,
v(l|1) >v (l|0) and v0(l|1) >v 0(l|0). (3)
I nt h ec a s et h a tθ is an accepted group member in some t>0 and is asked to make a contribution κt,
let dt ∈ {0,1} denote θ’s decision on whether or not to comply (respectively, dt =1or =0 ). Then in any
post-school year period, θ’s period t>0 payoﬀ from choosing dt is,
w + v(1 − atdtθκt|at). (4)
Firms Assume there are at least two identical and noncollusive ﬁrms which, at the end of the initial
period t =0 , engage in Bertrand bidding for employees to produce a homogenous and nonstorable product
in each period t =1 ,2,.... The salient features of an employee for a ﬁrm are education and type. So an
employee is characterized by a pair (s,θ) and the net value to a ﬁrm hiring employee (s,θ) at a wage-rate
w ≥ 0 in any period t>0 is
Yt(w,s,θ)=[ y(s,θ) − w]. (5)
Assume (for convenience) that ﬁrms do not discount the future and that
ys > 0,y θ > 0;yss ≤ 0,y sθ > 0 and y(0,·) ≡ 0. (6)
Firms have no interest in any individual save in his or her capacity as an employee, deﬁned by a pair (s,θ).
In particular, the ﬁrm neither observes nor cares about what any individual does while away from work.
Nevertheless, it is evidently possible to imagine a variety of employment contracts in this setting. Among
other things, under the assumption that per period output is observable, the ﬁrm learns any employee’s
type for sure by the end of the ﬁrst employment period. So in general we might expect to observe wage
contracts depending in part on future realized output. But dealing explicitly with such complications here
distracts greatly from the focus of the paper.13 Consequently we shall assume them away by presuming
ﬁrms suﬃciently large, ﬁrst, that average realized output from individuals with a given education level
accurately reﬂects the ﬁrms’ expectations at the time of recruitment and, second, to render individual
contract renegotiation unproﬁtably expensive. So feasible employment contracts are taken to specify a
constant wage-rate over time.
Peer Group To avoid trivialities, assume throughout that the peer group is nonempty. Although,
other things equal, individuals prefer inclusion in the peer group they may not in fact be accepted by the
(suitably anthropomorphized) group. Just as group acceptance is important to individuals, individuals yield
value to the group as a whole through consumption externalities, contributions, collegiality and so forth.
We will, essentially, black-box the interesting issue of endogenous peer group formation. In a related paper,
13If individuals’ types are fully revealed during the school years, then there is clearly no room for subsequent contract
renegotiation. But this is not true when equilibrium involves any pooling.
9Fryer (2003) deals explicitly with this, whereas we take the peer group as given and analyze the implications
in a richer economic environment.
Assume that if an individual is rejected by the group during that individual’s school years, t =0 ,t h e n
the individual cannot be accepted in any period t thereafter (it turns out that this is without any loss of
generality in the current model); however, an individual accepted by the group at t =0may be rejected in
any subsequent period. Normalize group payoﬀsi na n yp e r i o dt =1 ,2,...to be zero in the case that a given
individual is rejected at t =0 . Suppose the individual is accepted at t =0and remains accepted at the end
of period t−1 > 0. At the beginning of the period t, the group decides whether to accept (at =1 ) or reject
(at =0 ) θ for that period, following which Nature randomly chooses the group contribution κt ∈ {0,k}
required of θ and the individual either does (dt =1 )o rd o e sn o t( dt =0 ) make the contribution; both the
realization κt and the individual’s decision are observed by the group.
Let g(at,d t,κ t) be the period t>0 payoﬀ to the group from action at, given the individual makes decision
dt when the required contribution is κt. Then, for all realizations κt, g(0,d t,κ t)=0for all dt and
g(1,1,κ t)=b>0 ≥ g(1,0,κ t)=−Bκt.
The beneﬁts B, b are (for simplicity) taken to be independent of t and κt.
Thus, irrespective of whether the individual chooses to contribute, the group receives a zero payoﬀ when it
rejects the individual, but the group’s payoﬀ when it accepts the individual is contingent on the individual’s
behavior. The key feature of the group’s payoﬀs for what follows is that the group is strictly worse oﬀ having
accepted an individual who chooses not to make her required contribution than it would be were such an
individual rejected; i.e. −Bk < 0.W h e nκt =0 , the group strictly prefers to have accepted the individual
for period t.14
The group’s payoﬀs above are conditional on t>0. The group’s initial decision on whether to accept an
individual, however, is taken during the school years t =0 . Assume that the net period t =0beneﬁts to the
group of accepting an individual are normalized to zero (for example, there might be some cost to the group
for initiating a new member, oﬀsetting any t =0expected beneﬁt of adding the individual).
Recall that 1 − π is the probability that the individual is required to contribute k>0 to the group in










Assuming π is strictly smaller than Bk/[Bk + b] is a non-triviality condition; as will become clear shortly,
without the assumption all individuals are always accepted into the group. Substantively, assuming π is
smaller than v(1|0)/v(1|1) is equivalent to assuming that individuals prefer surely consuming their leisure
time on their own, to the expected value of being an accepted group member when there is a chance that
14These payoﬀs are a reduced form of a more general model of repeated interaction in which agents use “grim-trigger”
strategies. See Fryer (2001, 2003). Modeling the payoﬀs in this way further distinguishes our analysis from other signaling
models such as Bernheim (1994).
10remaining in the group requires having no leisure at all to consume; that is πv(1|1)+(1−π)v(0|1) <v (1|0).
Technically, the assumption precludes having to deal explicitly with some boundary cases in the later analysis.
Finally, just as ﬁrms are presumed to observe only aggregate output from those of a given education level,
assume that if a group member is an employee in some ﬁrm (i.e. w>0), then the group cannot identify the
speciﬁc output of the ﬁrm attributable to that member. This seems quite innocuous.
B. Strategies
The basic solution concept used here is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
At t =0 , the school years, an individual learns his or her type θ ∈ [0,θ) and chooses an observable eﬀort
level s ∈ [0,1] according to an education investment strategy,
σ :[ 0 ,θ) → [0,1].
Having observed the individual’s choice of eﬀort σ(θ) ∈ [0,1], the peer group chooses whether or not to
accept the individual into the group. The group’s initial acceptance strategy is a choice,
α0 :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]
where, for any s ∈ [0,1], α0(s) is the probability the group accepts the individual in the school years. While
rejection in the school years involves rejection for all subsequent periods (which turns out to be consistent
with equilibrium behavior), acceptance is contingent on future decisions.
Firms observe an individual’s eﬀort (equivalently, educational achievement), σ(θ) ∈ [0,1], at the end
of the period and engage in Bertrand wage bidding for his or her labour. Given that wages cannot be
renegotiated in subsequent periods, a wage strategy is a map,
w :[ 0 ,1] → [0,∞).





where F|s ≡ F(θ|s) describes the ﬁrm’s (and group’s) conditional beliefs regarding the individual’s type,
and the ﬁrm makes zero expected proﬁts at the time of recruitment. Once the wage is set, the ﬁrm has no
further decision to make. Hereafter, therefore, we take (8) as given.
As will become clear later, there is no loss in generality by restricting attention to pure strategies only
during the post-school years. For t ≥ 1,agroup history ht is a description of all the actions taken in periods
t0 =0 ,1,2,...,tby Nature (κt ∈ {0,k}), the individual (σ(θ), dt ∈ {0,1}), and the group (at ∈ {0,1}). For
t =0and realization a0 of the strategy α0(σ(θ)),s e th0 =( σ(θ),w(σ(θ),F|σ(θ)),a 0) and, for all t ≥ 1,s e t
ht =( ht−1,(κt;dt;at)).
11Let Ht = {ht} denote the set of all possible group histories for t ≥ 0. Then we can deﬁne the peer group’s
period t ≥ 1 (pure) strategy as a function,
αt : Ht−1 → {0,1}
where αt(κt,h t−1) is the probability the group accepts the individual in period t.
Given individuals’ preferences are separable in wages, period t ≥ 1 (pure) strategy for the individual is a
function,
ψt : {0,k}×[0,θ) × Ht−1 → {0,1}.
Putting the pieces together, a strategy for an individual is a list, (σ,{ψt}∞
t=1); a strategy for the group is
a list, (α0,{αt}∞
t=1); and, under the assumptions on contracts, the (symmetric) wage strategy for any ﬁrm
is ﬁxed to be the function w deﬁned by (8).
C. Payoffs
Once an individual’s wage rate is determined at the end of the school years, it is ﬁxed thereafter. Hence















where δ ∈ (0,1) is the individual’s discount factor, E is the expectations operator over Nature’s choice of
contribution κt and, by an abuse of notation, v(·|α0(σ(θ))) = α0(σ(θ))v(·|1) + [1 − α0(σ(θ))]v(·|0).
To deﬁne payoﬀs for the group, ﬁrst suppose the group accepts the individual in the school years, a0 =1 ,
and, for any t ≥ 1, recall g(at,d t,κ t) ∈ {b,−Bκt,0} is the stage-game payoﬀ from decisions (at,d t) when







0 if a0 =0
P∞
t=1 γt R θ
0 [Eg(αt(ht−1),ψt(κt,θ,h t−1),κ t)]dF(θ|ht−1) else
. (10)
3 Equilibrium
Fixing any ﬁrm’s strategy to be given by (8), an equilibrium is a strategy (σ∗,{ψ
∗
t}∞
t=1) for an individual
and a strategy (α∗
0,{α∗
t}∞
t=1) for the group, constituting sequentially rational mutual best responses at every
subgame and supported by beliefs over an individual’s type, F(θ|·), derived from Bayes rule wherever possible.
To ﬁnd equilibria to the game, we begin with behavior in the post-school years.
12A. The Post-School Years
There are many equilibria to the model described above, but in what follows we focus only on those
in which the group adopts a simple, familiar and intuitive strategy in the subgame beginning t =1 , viz.
Conditional on accepting an individual in the school years (t =0 ), the group continues to accept that
individual so long as he or she has made the required contribution to group maintenance in every preceding
period; should the individual ever elect not to contribute as required in some period t ≥ 1, the group
rejects the individual in every period thereafter. Formally, the group’s strategy contingent on accepting an
individual during the school years, α0(σ(θ)) = 1,i st a k e nt ob e :
[P1] : ∀t ≥ 1, α∗
t(ht−1)=1⇔ [ht−1 : dt−1 =1 ] .
Call the group strategy [P1] the peer pressure strategy.
Contingent on being accepted by the group in the school years, an individual’s best response to the peer








∀θ ≤ b θ, ψ
∗
t[b θ](κt,θ,h t−1)=1for all κt
∀θ>b θ, [ψ
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Under the strategy ψ
∗
t[b θ],a n yt y p el o w e rt h a nb θ always contributes and any type greater than b θ only
contributes when the required cost is low.
We are now in a position to describe the post-school years behavior of interest. The proof of Proposition
1, as with all subsequent formal results, is conﬁned to an Appendix.
Proposition 1 Let σ(θ) be individual θ’s school year educational investment and suppose, conditional on
being accepted by the group in the school years, the individual’s post-school year behavior is described by [P2].
Then α0(σ(θ)) = 1 and [P1] jointly constitute a best response to σ(θ) and [P2] if and only if
F(ˆ θ|σ(θ)) ≥
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
.
Furthermore, there exists a unique type b θ(δ) < 1/k such that, conditional on being accepted by the group in
the school years, the strategy ψ
∗
t[b θ(δ)] deﬁned by [P2] is a best response to [P1].M o r e o v e r ,b θ(δ) is strictly
increasing in δ on [0,1);a n dlimδ↓0b θ(δ)=0 .
Assume hereon that the post-school years’ behavior is as described by Proposition 1 and call any equilibrium
to the full game in which Proposition 1 describes post-school year behavior, a peer pressure equilibrium.
Proposition 1 says that the peer pressure strategy induces a unique threshold strategy ψ
∗
t[b θ(δ)] as a best
response by individuals belonging to the group. The critical type b θ(δ) is deﬁned by precisely that type
who, conditional on being accepted during the school years, is indiﬀerent between contributing and not
contributing the high cost when so required (where, given the group uses the peer pressure strategy, not
13contributing the high cost results in being rejected). As usual, the more individuals’ care about the future,
the less they have to gain from any short run free-riding and so this critical type increases in the discount
factor. It follows that, to accept an individual in the school years and support the peer pressure strategy, the
belief the group must hold regarding the individual’s type, F(ˆ θ|σ(θ)), must be no smaller than the quantity
F0 ≡
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
. (11)
Assumption (7) insures the critical value F0 is strictly positive and it is easy to check that F0 is decreasing
in π, the group’s discount factor γ and the beneﬁt b, but increasing in Bk. Consequently, the critical type
b θ(δ) (at least in part) vindicates the group never taking back a member who is rejected because of failing to
contribute as required: in equilibrium, the types rejected for not contributing are precisely those types who
would never contribute a high cost and who are thus unacceptable to the group.
Hereafter, to save notation we leave the dependency of the individual’s peer pressure equilibrium strategy





B. The School Years
Given any educational eﬀort σ(θ) during the school years, t =0 , ﬁrms’ best response decisions are given
by (8) with s = σ(θ). And as remarked earlier, ceteris paribus, all individuals strictly prefer to be accepted
rather than rejected by the group during the school years. However, Proposition 1 shows that the group is not
happy to accept all types as members: the group strictly prefers to accept θ if and only if F(ˆ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) >F 0
and is indiﬀerent over accepting and rejecting whenever F(ˆ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) = F0.
Given Proposition 1, the ﬁrms’ wage schedules (8) and the group’s school year decision criterion (11)
depend essentially on the individual educational investment strategy, σ. As in most signaling games, there
are multiple equilibria possible, even within the class of peer pressure equilibria. One sort of equilibrium,
however, surely does not exist here and that is any fully separating equilibria in which, for all types θ,θ
0,
θ 6= θ
0 implies σ(θ) 6= σ(θ
0).15
Say that a peer pressure equilibrium is fully separating if the equilibrium educational investment strategy
is separating over all types θ>0.
Proposition 2 There exist no fully separating peer pressure equilibria.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition behind Proposition 2. The ﬁgure describes the net (peer pressure
equilibrium) utility accruing to individual ˆ θ(δ) as a function of the chosen educational level under complete
15Strictly speaking, the notion of a separating strategy here should be conﬁned to the set of types for which the utility-
maximizing education under complete information is strictly positive. Nothing in the analysis hinges on this and so, to avoid
repeatedly having to make the appropriate qualiﬁcations, assume θ>0 implies θ’s complete information maximizing choice of
eﬀort is not zero (whether or not θ is accepted by the group). Given (1), this is assured if
lim
s→0
[ys(s,0) − v0(1 − s|·)] > 0.
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Figure 1: Payoﬀs for Marginal Type Under Complete Information
information, u∗(s,a0,w(s);ˆ θ): at any given educational investment level s, the individual’s net payoﬀ is
strictly greater being accepted than being rejected by the group and, further, in each case the net payoﬀ is
strictly concave in educational eﬀort with an interior maximum. If there were a (fully) separating equilibrium,
then there is no residual incomplete information and only those types θ ≤ ˆ θ(δ) would be accepted by the
group. This implies that the boundary type ˆ θ(δ) has to be indiﬀerent in equilibrium between being accepted
with a wage w and being rejected at a wage w0 >w , where the inequality follows from the marginal value
of leisure being lower for rejected than for accepted individuals at any positive educational investment level.
Therefore, as is clear from Figure 1, to support the equilibrium, the educational level inducing the wage
w must be strictly less than ˆ θ(δ)’s most preferred level of education conditional on group acceptance, s∗
1.
But this is inconsistent with separation under which higher types must invest strictly more than they would
under complete information so as to deter lower types from mimicking them (Appendix, Lemma 4).
Proposition 2 asserts that whenever there is peer pressure of the sort deﬁned here, then necessarily the
equilibrium involves some pooling of types. This still leaves a very large number of possibilities for equilibria,
depending in part on the parameters in eﬀect. Before considering any reﬁnements, it is useful to establish
some further general properties of any peer pressure equilibrium. For any pair of strategies (σ,α0),d e n o t e
the sets of types accepted and rejected by the group as, respectively, A(σ,α0)={θ : α0(σ(θ)) = 1} and
R(σ,α0)={θ : α0(σ(θ)) = 0}.
Proposition 3 Let (σ∗,α ∗
0) be components of some peer pressure equilibrium. Then,
(1) A(σ∗,α ∗
0) and R(σ∗,α ∗
0) are convex with supA(σ∗,α ∗
0)=i n fR(σ∗,α ∗
0);
(2) R(σ∗,α ∗
0) 6=[ 0 ,θ) implies there exists  >0 such that σ∗(θ) is constant on at least one of the intervals
(inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0) −  ,inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0)) or (inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0),inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0)+ );a n d
15(3) if σ∗ is separating on (inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0),inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0)+ ), inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0) ≥ ˆ θ(δ).
The ﬁrst claim of Proposition 3 is intuitive and follows easily from the monotonicity of any equilibrium
educational strategy in type (Appendix, Lemma 3); and the intuition for the second claim is essentially
identical to that supporting Proposition 2. The ﬁnal claim of the result is suggestive: if types rejected by
the group adopt a separating strategy, then necessarily the group accepts some types in equilibrium which
they would reject under complete information. The implications of this for observed behavior in the longer
run are discussed below.
Although the previous two results tell us a good deal about equilibria to the game, they do not, as already
remarked, pin down exactly what can occur. Consequently, we consider further belief-based equilibrium
reﬁnements. As Banks (1990, p.16) observes, most of the usual reﬁnements used for costly signaling games
support identical equilibria when payoﬀs exhibit an appropriate monotonicity property, a property satisﬁed
here where, other things being equal, higher wages are preferred to lower wages by all types (see also Cho and
Sobel 1990). One such reﬁnement much used in the literature is that of D1 equilibria (Banks and Sobel,1987;
Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and Sobel 1990).
Loosely speaking, the D1 reﬁnement requires out-of-equilibrium actions to be interpreted as being taken
by those types having most to gain from the deviation relative to their payoﬀs from the candidate equilib-
rium, conditional on the uninformed agents best-responding to these beliefs. Equilibria supported by such
out-of-equilibrium beliefs are called D1 equilibria, and the only D1 equilibrium to the canonic Spence job
signaling model is the Riley (separating) equilibrium. The Riley equilibrium (Riley, 1979) is the unique
eﬃcient separating equilibrium deﬁned by the initial condition whereby the lowest separating type adopts
its complete information best educational investment level; all higher types choose the lowest educational
levels consistent with separation and these strictly exceed their respective complete information decisions
(Appendix, Lemma 4). Although it is not clear-cut that the separating equilibria to the Spence model consti-
tute the “correct” predictions, they are certainly focal from an analytical perspective and have considerable
substantive intuition; insofar as high type individuals can beneﬁt from distinguishing themselves and are
capable of so doing, then we might expect any equilibrium behavior to reﬂect this. Consequently, we look for
separation in equilibrium educational investment strategies in the current model; in particular, the intuition
for why we might expect separation in the Spence model applies a fortiori when considering the educational
eﬀort decisions of those rejected by the group during the school years. Thus, for both this reason and to
facilitate comparisons across models, it seems reasonable to apply the D1 reﬁnement to the current model.
Further, ‘acting white’ is essentially about minorities pooling on low education levels, and D1 is the most
hostile to pooling equilibrium (relative to other standard reﬁnements).
Unfortunately, unlike for the Spence model, existence of D1 equilibria is not assured for all admissible
parameterizations. Before stating the existence result, it is useful to identify some key properties of D1
equilibria conditional on their existence. For any type θ,l e tσc
0(θ) denote the individual’s utility maximizing
choice of education assuming that θ is common knowledge and that the group rejects θ in the school years,
16[] → ← Types   Accepted
0 () δ θˆ * θ
θ
* σ
[] → ← Types   Accepted
0 () δ θˆ * θ
θ
[] → ← Types   Accepted
0 () δ θˆ * θ
θ
* σ
Figure 2: Typical D1 Peer Pressure Equilibrium Strategies, (σ∗,α ∗
0)
a0 =0 .
Proposition 4 Let (σ∗,α ∗
0) be components of a D1 peer pressure equilibrium. Then
(1) σ∗(θ)=σ∗(θ
0) for all θ,θ
0 ∈ A(σ∗,α ∗
0)=[ 0 ,θ
∗], θ
∗ ≥ ˆ θ(δ);a n d
(2) the restriction of σ∗ to the set of rejected types, R(σ∗,α ∗
0)=( θ
∗,¯ θ), is the unique eﬃcient separating
equilibrium strategy on R(σ∗,α ∗




In words, in any D1 peer pressure equilibrium the type-space can be partitioned into two intervals, [0,θ
∗]
and (θ
∗,∞),s u c ht h a ta l lt y p e si n[0,θ
∗] pool on a common educational investment level and are accepted
by the group, and all types greater than θ
∗ separate and are rejected by the group16. Figure 2 illustrates
Proposition 4.
There is no guarantee that D1 peer pressure equilibria, when they exist, are unique. However, from the
proposition and the monotonicity of payoﬀs in type at any given education, wage and group decision, a
strictly positive educational investment by individuals accepted by the group, say s1 > 0, can be supported
in a D1 equilibrium only if the lowest accepted type is willing to choose s1 rather than invest in education at
some s<s 1. Such a condition is necessary because, under D1, any out-of-equilibrium downward deviation
from s1 is interpreted by the ﬁrms as coming surely from the lowest type, θ =0 . The lower is the discount
factor, therefore, the more likely it is that peer pressure leads to pooling in the group on minimal educational
achievement.
Proposition 4 says that if a D1 equilibrium exists, the educational investment strategy σ∗ must be
separating over the set of rejected types, R(σ∗,α ∗
0). By Proposition 3, therefore, we must have the highest
16Fryer (2002) obtains a similar bi-polarization in the type space.
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Figure 3: Existence of D1 Peer Pressure Equilibria
types accepted by the group using a pooling educational investment strategy in equilibrium and the highest
accepted type can be no lower than ˆ θ(δ). But since D1 also rules out any discontinuities in the educational
strategy σ∗ on A(σ∗,α ∗
0), it is possible for there not to exist an educational level s1 a n da na s s o c i a t e d
equilibrium wage w(s1) consistent both with ˆ θ(δ) and the lowest accepted type θ =0choosing s1 at w.T h u s
there is no guarantee that D1 equilibria generally exist in the model. It turns out, however, that so long as
individuals are suﬃciently impatient, there is no problem.
Proposition 5 There are discount factors δ1,δ2 with 0 <δ 1 ≤ δ2 < 1, such that D1 peer pressure equilibria
exist if δ ≤ δ1 and only if δ ≤ δ2.
Proposition 5 says that D1 peer pressure equilibria surely exist for low discount factors (δ ≤ δ1), might
exist for some factors slightly higher (δ ∈ (δ1,δ2]), but surely do not exist for suﬃciently high values of δ
(δ>δ 2). To get some intuition for the result, consider Figure 3. The downward sloping curves labeled
θ
∗(δ;s) describe, as a function of δ,t h et y p ei n d i ﬀerent between pooling on s ≥ 0 and being accepted by
the group, and separating at his or her complete information best educational choice, say s(θ
∗),a n db e i n g
rejected. Individual θ
∗(δ;s), therefore, is the marginal equilibrium member of the group in an equilibrium
in which all individuals accepted by the group choose education level s.
Suppose ﬁrst that the discount factor is some δ
0 <δ 1 and assume that accepted types in an equilibrium
at δ
0 pool on zero education; in this case, ˆ θ(δ
0) <θ
∗(δ
0;0). Under the assumptions on beliefs deﬁning D1,
any deviation to a strictly positive out-of-equilibrium education level s ∈ (0,s(θ
∗)) induces both ﬁrms and
the group to infer the deviant’s type as θ
∗(δ
0;0). It follows that by choosing to deviate to some education
level  >0, the individual elicits an appropriately higher wage (a beneﬁt) but is rejected by the group (a
18cost); in equilibrium, these responses deter θ
∗(δ
0;0)from such a deviation and the equilibrium satisﬁes D1.
Now consider some discount factor δ
00 >δ 2 and assume s00 > 0 is the highest educational level that can
be sustained in any equilibrium at δ
00 in which all types [0,θ
∗(δ
00;s00)] are willing to pool and be accepted by
the group. Given s00 > 0 the common wage paid to all accepted group members is strictly positive and so
the indiﬀerent marginal type here, θ
∗(δ;s00), is strictly greater than the type θ




00;s00). Consequently, if this individual deviates to s00+  and reveals her type, she earns a higher
wage as before but is no longer rejected by the group; ˆ θ(δ
00) >θ
∗(δ
00;s00) implies the individual is a reliable
group member so the group’s best response conditional on learning her type is to continue to accept her.
Therefore, such a deviation makes θ
∗(δ
00;s00) strictly better oﬀ implying the equilibrium at δ
00 cannot satisfy
D1.
The argument for the proposition shows that discount rates such as δ
0 and δ
00 surely exist. In fact, the
proof for the existence of D1 equilibria at rates δ ≤ δ1 is constructive and establishes a stronger result:
Proposition 6 There is a discount factor δ1 > 0 such that a D1 peer pressure equilibrium exists in which
all accepted types pool on zero educational investment if and only if δ ≤ δ1. Moreover, at each δ ≤ δ1 there
is a unique “zero education” D1 equilibrium.
Although the proposition involves no claim that the “zero education” D1 equilibrium is the unique D1
equilibrium for δ ≤ δ1, the willingness of individuals to acquire any signiﬁcant education in the school
years is much diminished when the future is heavily discounted. That peer pressure incentives should drive
equilibrium education to zero for group members is therefore not implausible. And even if higher types
would, absent peer pressure, select signiﬁcant education levels, the more costly it becomes for the lowest
types to acquire education the more likely it becomes that the zero education D1 equilibrium is the only
such equilibrium.
When δ>δ 2, insisting on the D1 reﬁnement leads to equilibrium non-existence, as discussed above,
and may also do so for δ>δ 1. However, there do exist many other (non-D1) peer pressure equilibria for
these discount rates. Since a particularly appealing property of D1 equilibria when they exist is (we believe)
that they demand separation over the set of types rejected by the peer group, we propose to look only
at equilibria for high factors that preserve this property. And, to preserve some sort of continuity in the
equilibrium selection, we also restrict attention to those separating segments deﬁned by the initial condition
that the least rejected type separates with its complete information best educational investment level. In
view of Proposition 3(3), this gives the following reﬁned set of equilibria.
Proposition 7 Suppose δ>δ 1 a n dn oD 1e q u i l i b r i u me x i s t s . A s s u m e(σ∗,α ∗
0) are components of a peer
pressure equilibrium in which the restriction of σ∗ to the set of rejected types, R(σ∗,α ∗
0)=( θ
∗,¯ θ), is the unique
eﬃcient separating equilibrium strategy on R(σ∗,α ∗
0) with initial condition, limη↓0 σ∗(θ
∗+η)=σc
0(θ
∗).T h e n
θ
∗ ≥ ˆ θ(δ) and there exists a type θ1 < ˆ θ(δ) such that:
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Figure 4: Peer Pressure Equilibria at a High Discount Factor
(2) either the restriction of σ∗ to the interval [0,θ 1) is separating, or there exists at least one other pooling
segment in this interval; in both cases limθ↑θ1 σ∗(θ) <s 1.
Proposition 7 leaves open a variety of possibilities for equilibrium education decisions for the lowest
segment of types, [0,θ1). There are two polar cases worth making explicit here: in the ﬁrst, all types
θ ∈ [0,θ 1) separate; and in the second, all types θ ∈ [0,θ1) pool on a common educational investment.
Figure 4 illustrates these alternatives.
The higher is the discount factor, the greater the long-run economic return to educational investment
in the school years. It seems intuitive that any negative impact of peer pressure on individual eﬀort in the
school years is increasingly attenuated as people value the future more highly and the equilibrium predictions
of the last three propositions reﬂect this intuition. When the discount factor is suﬃciently low, peer pressure
is eﬀective and the desire to signal that one is an appropriate type for the group induces considerable
underinvestment in education by many types, at least relative to the no-peer pressure separating equilibrium;
only the highest types break away. The consequence is that group members all share a common minimal
education level with the associated wage, while those rejected by the group are discretely more educated and
earn distinctly higher incomes. For higher discount factors (δ>δ 1), peer pressure is attenuated. At least for
δ>δ 2, there has to be variation in the equilibrium distribution of educational eﬀorts and economic returns
among accepted group members. And since the critical type is increasing in the discount factor (Proposition
1), the group, other things being equal, accepts a broader set of types; thus we expect to ﬁnd not only
increasing variation in education and wage levels within the group as δ goes up, but also an increase in the
type variation of accepted group members. Nevertheless peer pressure remains manifest in that the high
types accepted by the group in the school years necessarily adopt the same educational eﬀort strategy and
20continue to include types who will almost surely renege on the group and be rejected at some post-school
year date. Formally, as illustrated in both Figures 2 and 4, Propositions 4 and 7 directly imply,
Corollary 1 Assume the restriction of the educational investment strategy in a peer pressure equilibrium to
the set of rejected types, R(σ∗,α ∗
0), is separating on that set. Then there (almost always) exists a strictly
positive measure of types who are accepted by the group in the school years but who leave the group when
ﬁrst asked to contribute the high cost, k>0. And since educational investment is sunk, these types see no
change in their earned income.
Consequently, the model predicts that we should observe the (relatively) high types leaving the group at
some time, being rejected but continuing to work at their original, low, wage. In other words, following the
school years there are, eventually, three sorts of individual in equilibrium: those accepted by the group who
remain loyal and earn little; those originally accepted who eventually renege on the group and are rejected
but continue to earn the low wage common to group members; and those rejected by the group in the school
years who are signiﬁcantly more educated and earn distinctly higher incomes than the other two sorts.
4 A Benchmark: Tolerant Peer Group
To provide a benchmark against which to juxtapose the results on peer pressure equilibria, we consider a
peer group that exerts no pressure at all. To do this, suppose ﬁrst that individual θ is an accepted member
of the group in any post-school year t ≥ 1 and assume Nature has revealed the contribution κt.B e f o r ea n y
individual compliance decision for the period is taken, assume the individual makes a costless (i.e. cheap
talk) statement about whether he or she intends to make the contribution κt as required. Formally, for any
type θ and realization κt,l e tτ(κt,θ) describe the θ’s statement of intent, where τ(κt,θ)=0[respectively,
1]m e a n sθ claims he or she does not [respectively, does]i n t e n dt oc o n t r i b u t eκt. It is not hard to see that
since making the statement involves no costs to the individual irrespective of any realization (κt,θ),t h e
preceding analysis of peer pressure equilibria is wholly unaﬀected; given the peer pressure strategy [P1],t h e
possibility of cheap talk adds nothing. However, in groups devoid of peer pressure, the option to make cheap
talk statements has bite.
A tolerant group is a peer group that adopts the following strategy:
[T1] : At t =0 ,c h o o s eα∗
0(s)=1all s ∈ [0,1] and, for all t ≥ 1,c h o o s e
α∗
t(ht−1)=1⇔ [τ(κt,·)=1and, ∀r =1 ,...,t, h t−r : dt−r = τ(κt−r,·)].
In words, all individuals are accepted during the school years and any individual is accepted by the group
in any period t ≥ 1 so long as that individual states that he or she intends to make the period t required
contribution and has always honoured previous statements of intent. An individual is rejected in period
t alone if she states an intention not to contribute and has always done as she claimed she would in the
21past; and an individual is rejected for all periods if she has ever claimed an intention to contribute but then
reneged on that claim. Tolerant groups are therefore more like trading partners than peer groups in which
the opportunities for mutually proﬁtable trade arrive stochastically and depend on an individual’s type.
Given a tolerant group, deﬁne the (low) type θ
T to be that type who is indiﬀerent between making every
required contribution κt ∈ {0,k} in every period and making only the contribution κt =0in any period t.
It is not hard to see that θ

















Thus any type greater than θ
T only claims an intention to contribute when the required contribution is
negligible; only the low types θ ≤ θ
T oﬀer to make the high contribution. Given [T1], all claims under [T2]
are honoured.
Call any equilibrium in which post-school year behavior is described by [T1] and [T2],atolerant equilib-
rium.
Proposition 8 There exists a tolerant equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ 1/[1 + π]. Moreover, if there exists a
tolerant equilibrium, then there exists a tolerant equilibrium in which all types separate in the school years.
Tolerant groups can survive in equilibrium only when individuals are suﬃciently patient relative to the
likelihood of having to contribute k>0 to the group. To see why the ﬁrst condition is required, recall that
statements of intent are cheap talk and the payoﬀ for an individual who reneges on his stated intent under
[T1], is identical to that of an accepted group member who defects under the peer pressure strategy [P1].
Similarly, the payoﬀ to an individual from making every contribution to the group is the same irrespective
of whether the group is tolerant or subject to peer pressure. Consequently, a necessary condition for the
existence of a tolerant group is that the value to an individual of always stating his or her intent honestly
and so remaining in the group at least for some periods, is at least as big as the value of stating an intention
to contribute k, reneging on this statement once accepted by the group for that period, but being rejected
thereafter. This condition is that θ
T ≤ ˆ θ(δ) or, equivalently, that the joint restriction on δ and π holds.
When individuals are relatively impatient, tolerant groups do not exist and some form of peer pressure is
required to support the group. On the other hand, since tolerant groups have evident prima facie eﬃciency
advantages over groups with peer pressure when tolerant equilibria exist, the obvious question is under what
circumstances might peer eﬀects be observed when the tolerant strategy [T1] is available? Let σ(θ) denote
the peer pressure equilibrium educational strategy. Then we have
Proposition 9 Assume there exists a tolerant equilibrium. Then the group prefers peer pressure to tolerance






22In interpreting this result, it should be emphasized that the assumption of an anthropomorphized group
makes the analysis here essentially one of the group’s decision on the marginal prospective individual, the
individual θ. Consequently, without explicitly allocating the group’s costs and beneﬁts among existing
members, virtually nothing can be said about all individuals’ relative payoﬀs across the equilibria. The
exception is that all types who separate and are rejected in the school years under peer pressure, are strictly
better oﬀ with a tolerant group than otherwise. On the other hand, the proposition does show that peer
pressure is more likely to be preferred when the beneﬁts from an individual (i.e. b) are relatively high or
when the distribution of types is distinctly skewed to the right and there is a high proportion of low types
in the population.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Nearly 140 years after the abolishment of Chattel slavery, many economic indices exhibit drastic racial
inequities. Black seventeen year olds read at a proﬁciency level of white thirteen year olds. Black male
and female median earnings are substantially below their white counterparts in every education level except
high school drop outs. Black employment rates are below whites for every occupational category, save
Operators, Laborers, and service occupations. Ten percent of the black population age eighteen through
twenty-four, working full time, live beneath the poverty threshold. Blacks constitute nearly sixty percent of
those incarcerated, yet they barely make up twelve percent of the overall population (see Loury, 2002).
We consider one phenomenon that can help explain some of these disparities. The model here formalizes
‘acting white’ and explores its implications for individuals’ education decisions during their school years.
Together, two of the main results from the model yield the motivating stylized facts regarding ‘acting
white’ and underachievement documented in the anthropology and sociology literatures: ﬁrst, there exist no
equilibria in which all types of individuals adopt distinct educational investment levels and, second, when
individuals are not too patient, all equilibria satisfying a standard reﬁnement involve a binary partition of
the type space in which all types accepted by the group pool on a common low education level and all types
rejected by the group separate at distinctly higher levels of education with correspondingly higher wages.
A third main result bears on the relative importance of peer pressure incentives. The formal result is
that when individuals are very patient, the reﬁned equilibria do not exist, but a fairly natural (at least in
spirit) extension of the reﬁnement predicts an increase in the variation of education levels within the group
and an increase in the variance of types deemed acceptable by the group. Substantively, this translates into
stating that the more those involved discount the future, the more acute peer pressure becomes and the
more homogenous groups become.17 And it is worth remarking that the nondegenerate pooling property of
high accepted types when individuals are more patient, illustrated in Figure 3, oﬀers some justiﬁcation for
the Phelps (1972) assumption that the ability of minority workers is oftentimes perceived more noisily than
17Along these lines, the model also supports the intuitive comparative statics that peer pressure becomes more acute as the
expected contribution level increases, and as the costs to the group of any individual defecting once admitted increase.
23that of similarly qualiﬁed majority workers. Suppose that minority individuals are subject to accusations of
‘acting white’ at school from which majority individuals are free. Then, in equilibrium, a minority individual
and a majority individual can both achieve the same intermediate educational level but, whereas the latter
can do so through separation, to avoid peer rejectiont h ef o r m e rc a no n l yd os ot h r o u g hp o o l i n gw i t ho t h e r
minority types. Thus the two signals are indeed distinct in the way postulated by Milgrom and Oster (1987).
One further result worth emphasizing is that there always exist some types of individuals in equilibrium
who ‘succumb’ to peer pressure and are accepted by the group in the school years, but who subsequently
defect from the group when expected to make a high contribution. This last result predicts the existence
of individuals who ﬁnd themselves eventually rejected by their peers yet distinctly under-educated relative
to what they would have been absent peer pressure. Consequently, since education is accrued in the model
only during the school years, these individuals realize no change in their economic well-being once out of the
group.
Along similar lines, it is not hard to check that if all ﬁrms experience a uniform upward shift in pro-
ductivity (say, for all strictly positive (s,θ), dy(s,θ) > 0) then (at least in a D1 equilibrium) the wages of
those rejected by the group in the school years correspondingly increase and do so strictly more than any
increase in wages of those accepted by the peer group; in particular, group members experience no economic
improvement in a zero education equilibrium. Against this, the change in wages for rejected group members
induces the marginal group member to break away in the school years and join those rejected by the group.
The qualitative character of the results is robust to changes in some of the assumptions. For instance, the
assumption that required contributions from an individual to the group are either low or high is a convenience.
Assuming instead that such contributions could take any one of a continuum of values induces a corresponding
continuum of thresholds such that diﬀerent types defect from the group at diﬀerent cost levels. The main
consequence of the change is that attrition from the group might occur during multiple periods, with the
highest admitted types defecting earliest. All else, including the basic structure of equilibrium educational
investment decisions, remains as described. On the other hand, the restriction on admissible wage contracts
that might be oﬀered by ﬁrms is important. Given the presumed technology, an employee whose type is not
known surely at the time of employment will necessarily reveal his or her type after one day of work since de
facto output and the employee’s education are observed; there are then incentives for renegotiating the wage
contract for future periods. Furthermore, since the group can observe any member’s income, an individual’s
status as a group member or not can be aﬀected. Incorporating wage renegotiation leads to considerable
complications and the equilibrium consequences of admitting a full slate of contracts is as yet obscure.
Our model can be extended in a myriad of directions. The most obvious is to interact it with popular
policy initiatives such as aﬃrmative action, diversity programs, and educational interventions (i.e. head
start).
246 Technical Appendix
For any r ∈ [0,1] and a ∈ {0,1},d e ﬁne
E(r)v(1 − θ˜ κ|a) ≡ rv(1|a)+( 1− r)v(1 − θk|a).
Lemma 1 identiﬁes a group member’s best response to the peer pressure strategy [P1] conditional on being
accepted by the group in the school years.
Lemma 10 Suppose σ and the peer pressure strategy [P1] are played in an equilibrium and α0(σ(θ)) = 1.





ab e s tr e s p o n s et o[P1],w h e r e
(1) θ ≤ b θ(δ) ⇒ ψ
∗
t(κt,θ,h t−1)=1for all κt;
(2) θ>b θ(δ) ⇒ [ψ
∗





t(·) is the unique best response strategy to [P1] for all such t>0,u pt ow h e t h e rb θ(δ) chooses 1
or 0 at κt = k;a n db θ(δ) is strictly increasing in δ on [0,1) with limδ↓0 ˆ θ(δ)=0 .
Proof. Let θ be accepted by the group for the current period t>0 and assume the group uses the peer
pressure strategy. It is, without loss of generality, convenient for the argument to follow to relabel time so
the current (post-school years) period is indexed at zero. If κ =0then dt =1and dt =0are observationally
identical and there is no decision to be taken. So assume κ = k and ﬁrst note that, since lt(·,θ) ≥ 0 for
all θ,c h o o s i n gdt =1is not a feasible action for any type θ>1/k,i nw h i c hc a s eψt(k,θ,ht−1)=0is the
unique best response for such types. So assume θ ≤ 1/k.G i v e n[P1], the expected discounted payoﬀ to θ
from choosing to contribute at every cost κt, dt =1all t,i s :




w + E(π)v(1 − θ˜ κ|1)
¤
(12)
On the other hand, if κt = k and θ chooses not to contribute k>0 today (t) then, under the peer pressure
strategy, θ receives the defect payoﬀ for one period and is subsequently rejected by the group thereafter. So
the expected payoﬀ from choosing dt =0when κt = k is:
U[0;k,θ]=w + v(1|1) +
δ
1 − δ
[w + v(1|0)] (13)
Hence, comparing (12) and (13), θ’s best response decision depends on the diﬀerence,




E(π)v(1 − θ˜ κ|1) − v(1|0)
¤
.



















(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0). (14)
25Since v(l(·,θ)|a) is strictly increasing in l,
lim
θ→0
E(πδ)v(1 − θ˜ κ|1) = v(1|1).
Therefore, for θ suﬃciently small,
E(πδ)v(1 − θ˜ κ|1) > [(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0)].





E(πδ)v(1 − θ˜ κ|1) = πδv(1|1)
and choosing dt =1is not a feasible action for θ>1/k. However, by (7) and δ<1,
πδv(1|1) ≤ δv(1|0) < [(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0)].
Therefore, by monotonicity of U[dt;κ,θ] in θ, there exists a unique type ˆ θ ∈ (0,1/k) such that U[1;k,ˆ θ]=
U[0;k,ˆ θ]. By monotonicity, b θ(δ)=ˆ θ is the required type. That is,
E(πδ)v(1 −b θ(δ)˜ κ|1) − [(1 − δ)v(1|1) + δv(1|0)] ≡ 0. (15)
Since b θ(δ) < 1/k, implicit diﬀerentiation through (15) with respect to δ yields ˆ θ(δ) strictly increasing in δ
on (0,1).A n d ﬁnally, that limδ↓0 ˆ θ(δ)=0follows directly from taking δ → 0 in (15); and the uniqueness
claim is apparent from the existence argument. ¤
Hereafter, assume (as speciﬁed in statement (1) of Lemma 3) that an individual of type b θ(δ) always chooses
to contribute when indiﬀerent.
L e m m a1i d e n t i ﬁes an individual θ’s best response ψ
∗
t, to the peer pressure strategy, contingent on being
an accepted member of the group at the start of any period t ≥ 1.L e m m a2i d e n t i ﬁes the conditions under
which the peer pressure strategy is a best response to ψ
∗
t.
Lemma 11 Let σ(θ) be an individual θ’s educational investment decision at t =0 .T h e ni na n yp e e rp r e s s u r e
equilibrium the group accepts the individual during the school years if
F(ˆ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) >
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
and only if this inequality is weak.
Proof. By assumption, rejecting the individual during the school years, a0(σ(θ)) = 0, implies a zero payoﬀ
to the group thereafter. On the other hand, by Lemma 1, accepting the individual in t =0yields an expected
payoﬀ to the group of b>0 in each period if the individual is type θ ≤ ˆ θ(δ) but not if θ>ˆ θ(δ).S u p p o s e
the group accepts θ>ˆ θ(δ). Then with probability 1 − π the group receives −Bk < 0 in t =1following
which the group rejects θ and receives zero thereafter, and with probability π the group receives b and θ
26remains an accepted group member, in which case the same lottery confronts the group for t =2 ;a n ds oo n .
Discounting back to t =0 , the expected payoﬀ to the group of accepting individual θ>ˆ θ(δ) in the school
years sums to
[πb− (1 − π)Bk]γ
1 − πγ
.
Hence, in any peer pressure equilibrium the expected value to the group of accepting an individual with










+[ 1− F(ˆ θ(δ)|σ(θ))]
γ[πb− (1 − π)Bk]
1 − πγ
.
Therefore, the group accepts an individual with educational investment σ(θ) in the school years, i.e. α0(σ(θ)) =











t=1),w] ≥ 0 ⇔
F(ˆ θ(δ)|σ(θ)) ≥
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
.
as required for necessity. Furthermore, by (7), the RHS of the inequality lies strictly between zero and
one. That the group accepts surely whenever the preceding inequalities are strict follows from sequential
rationality. ¤
For future reference, recall
F0 ≡
[(1 − π)Bk − πb](1 − γ)
[b +( 1− γ)Bk](1 − π)
for the minimal belief necessary for the group to accept an individual into the group.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1The proposition follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2. ¤
We now conﬁrm some familiar properties of equilibrium strategies σ.B y ( 6 ) , n o ﬁrm will employ an
individual without any education. Consequently, an individual θ’s expected payoﬀ (9) from choosing eﬀort





















t(ht−1))] depends on σ(θ) only insofar as θ’s
eﬀort choice inﬂuences whether θ is accepted by the group in the school years. In particular, if α∗
0(σ(θ)) = 0
then V (0;θ,δ)=δv(1|0)/(1 − δ).
Lemma 12 Consider any pair of types θ
0, θ
00 and let σ be any equilibrium educational investment strategy.
Suppose α0(σ(θ
0)) = α0(σ(θ





27Proof. Write s0 ≡ σ(θ
0), w0 ≡ w(σ(θ





0] ≥ u[(s00,·),(α0,·),w 00;θ
0],
u[(s00,·),(α0,·),w 00;θ
00] ≥ u[(s0,·),(α0,·),w 0;θ
00].
Substituting from (16), the preceding inequalities can be written equivalently
[v(1 − s0|α0) − c(s0,θ





[v(1 − s0|α0) − c(s0,θ










And since csθ(s,θ) < 0 by (1), θ
0 <θ
00 and the inequality jointly imply s0 ≤ s00, as claimed. ¤
Thus educational choice is monotonic in type, both among group members and among those rejected by
the group. The next result conﬁrms the ineﬃciency inherent in separating equilibria, should they exist. For
any type θ,l e tσc
a0(θ) denote the individual’s utility maximizing choice of educational eﬀort assuming θ is
common knowledge and group membership is ﬁxed at a0 ∈ {0,1}.
Lemma 13 Let I ⊆ [0,θ) be any open interval, and assume σ is a separating equilibrium strategy on I.
Suppose α0(σ(θ)) = a0 ∈ {0,1} is constant on I. Then for all θ ∈ I, σ(θ) >σ c
a0(θ).
Proof. By Lemma 3 and (e.g.) Royden (1968), since α0 ∈ {0,1} is constant in σ(θ) on I, σ(·) is diﬀerentiable
in θ almost everywhere on this interval. And α0 invariant also gives V (α0(σ(θ));θ,δ)=V (α0;θ,δ) all
θ ∈ I.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eσ(θ) is separating and so (by deﬁnition) fully reveals θ, (8) implies w(σ(θ),F|σ(θ))=











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ0=θ
=0 .








[(1 − δ)(v0(·|a0)+cs) − δys]
, (17)
where the arguments of the functions are suppressed. By assumption, σ is a separating equilibrium strategy
on I and so Lemma 3 requires dσ(θ)/dθ > 0 almost everywhere on the interval. Hence, (17) implies
[(1 − δ)(v0(·|a0)+cs) − δys]|s=σ(θ) > 0. (18)
Now by deﬁnition, σc
a0(θ) is a solution to the ﬁrst order condition
d
ds




28So, because the second order condition holds under the maintained assumptions, σc
a0(θ) uniquely solves
[δys − (1 − δ)(v0(·|a0)+cs)]|s=σc
a0(θ) =0 . (19)
The Lemma now follows by comparing (18) with (19). ¤
Remark 1 Given (3), inspection of (17) and (19) yields that under complete information - either through
use of a separating strategy or because types are common knowledge ex ante - all θ>0 individuals invest
strictly more eﬀort in education if they are rejected by the group than if they are accepted.
To save on notation, for any education strategy σ, group action a0,a n dt y p eθ let




Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose the contrary and let σ be an equilibrium separating strategy, so w(σ(θ),F|σ(θ))=
y(σ(θ),θ) for all θ. By Lemma 2, there exists (in equilibrium) some type θ
◦ ≤ ˆ θ(δ) such that α0(σ(θ)) = 1 if
and only if θ ≤ θ
◦;w r i t eσ(θ)=σ0(θ) if θ>θ
◦,a n dw r i t eσ(θ)=σ1(θ) if θ ≤ θ
◦. By continuity of individual
utility, θ
◦ must be indiﬀerent between being accepted and being rejected by the group in the school years.
Using (16) and σ separating, θ








Because all θ>0 are employed in a separating equilibrium, deﬁnition of ˆ θ(δ) i nt h ep r o o ft oL e m m a1[ s e e
(14) and (15)] implies
V (1;θ,δ) − V (0;θ,δ) ≥ v(1|1) − v(1 − θk|1) > 0





◦,δ) > 0. (21)
And under the maintained assumptions, (21) in turn requires σ0(θ
◦) >σ 1(θ






◦) ≥ 0. (22)
But since U(s,a0;θ




◦) which contradicts Lemma 4. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3 Since the prior cdf F is smooth with support [0,θ), claim (1) follows directly from
Lemmas 2 and 3. To establish the second claim, assume R(σ∗,α ∗
0) 6=[ 0 ,θ) and let θ
m ≡ inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0).I f
there is no  >0 with σ∗(θ) constant on at least one of the intervals (θ
m −  ,θ
m) or (θ
m,θ
m +  ),t h e n
L e m m a3i m p l i e sσ∗(θ) must be separating on (θ
m −  0,θ




m − η)) = 1 and limη↓0 α∗
0(σ∗(θ
m + η)) = 0.B u ts i n c eθ
m must be indiﬀerent between being
accepted and being rejected by the group, the argument for Proposition 2 implies that either inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0) <
29θ
m −  0 or inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0) >θ
m +  0,ac o n t r a d i c t i o ni nb o t hc a s e s . F i n a l l y ,s u p p o s eσ∗ is separating on
the interval (θ
m,θ
m +  ) with  >0 and θ
m ≡ inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0) < ˆ θ(δ). Then there exist η>0 such that
θ
m + η<ˆ θ(δ); by Lemma 2, therefore, α∗
0(σ∗(θ
m + η)) = 1, contradicting θ
m + η ∈ R(σ∗,α ∗
0) and proving
(3). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4By Proposition 2, σ∗ cannot be separating on [0,θ) and, by (1), σ∗(θ) < 1 for all
θ ∈ [0,θ) in any equilibrium. By Proposition 3, R(σ∗,α ∗
0) is an interval (θ
∗,θ);l e tlimη↓0 σ∗(θ
∗ + η)=s∗.
By Cho & Sobel (1990, Lemma 4.1(d)), if the equilibrium is D1 then it is supported by beliefs under which,
for any out-of-equilibrium signal s0 >s ∗, the group’s best response is likewise α0(s0)=0 .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
since s∗ < 1, we can apply Cho & Sobel (1990, Proposition 4.1) to yield pooling on R(σ∗,α ∗
0) inconsistent
with D1. Therefore, if σ∗ is part of a D1 peer pressure equilibrium, σ∗ must be separating on R(σ∗,α ∗
0),
proving the ﬁrst part of (2). Proposition 3 now implies there exists some θ
0 <θ
∗ such that σ∗(θ)=¯ s for all
θ ∈ [θ
0,θ
∗] ⊆ A(σ∗,α ∗
0) and θ
∗ ≥ ˆ θ(δ). To complete the argument for (1),w eh a v et os h o wθ
0 =0 .
Suppose σ∗(θ) is not constant in θ on A(σ∗,α ∗
0)=[ 0 ,θ
∗]. Then by Lemma 3 there exists an equilibrium
educational investment level s<¯ s such that σ∗(θ)=s for some θ ∈ A(σ∗,α ∗
0) and σ∗(θ) ∈ (s, ¯ s) for no
θ ∈ [0,θ). Furthermore, Lemma 3 and (equilibrium) U continuous in educational investment for a ﬁxed group




◦,δ). But then the argument
for Cho & Sobel (1990, Proposition 4.1) can again be applied, mutatis mutandis, to derive a contradiction
with D1. Hence, if σ∗ is part of a D1 peer pressure equilibrium, θ
0 =0and σ∗ must be pooling on A(σ∗,α ∗
0)
with σ∗(θ)=¯ s for all θ ∈ A(σ∗,α ∗
0).
Let σ∗(θ)=¯ s for all θ ∈ A(σ∗,α ∗
0)=[ 0 ,θ
∗],a n dl e tlimη↓0 σ∗(θ
∗ + η)=s∗. It remains to check
s∗ = σc
0(θ






By Lemma 4 and concave preferences in s, s∗ ≥ σc
0(θ
∗) > s. Suppose s∗ >σ c
0(θ




∗).S i n c eα∗
0(σ∗(θ)) = 0 for all θ>θ
∗ and θ
∗ ≥ ˆ θ(δ), Lemma 2 implies
(generically) the group would reject θ
∗ conditional on identifying θ
∗ and σ(θ
∗) ≥ s. Thus, Cho & Sobel (1990,
Lemma 4.1(d)) yields that both ﬁrms and the group put probability zero on the deviation being sent by any
type θ<θ
∗; and deﬁnition of σc
0(θ
∗) implies all probability weight is placed on θ





∗,δ), continuity implies, limη↓0 U(σ∗(θ
∗+η),0;θ




for suﬃciently small η>0, θ
∗ + η strictly prefers to deviate to σc
0(θ
∗), contradicting s∗ >σ c
0(θ
∗) in a D1
equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5 Fix δ ∈ (0,1) arbitrarily and write ˆ θ(δ) ≡ ˆ θ. By Proposition 4, it suﬃces to
consider educational investment strategies of the following form: for any θ
0 ∈ [ˆ θ,¯ θ),d e ﬁne the strategy
σ(·|θ
0) such that, for all θ ≤ θ
0, σ(θ|θ
0)=s and, for all θ ∈ (θ
0,¯ θ), σ(·|θ
0) ≡ σa(·|θ
0) is the separating strategy













and note that, for any θ>θ
0, w(σa(θ|θ
0),F|σa(·))=y(σa(θ|θ
0),θ) > 0;w r i t ewsep(θ;θ
0) ≡ y(σa(θ|θ
0),θ).
With these preliminaries, consider the suﬃciency argument.
(Suﬃciency) The proof is by construction: we ﬁrst show there exists a D1 equilibrium at δ in which all
accepted types pool on s =0if, and only if, ˆ θ weakly prefers adopting the pooling strategy σ(θ|ˆ θ)=0to
the separating strategy σ0(θ|ˆ θ)=σc
0(ˆ θ); we then argue that ˆ θ(δ) weakly prefers this pooling strategy if and
only if δ ≤ δ1.S os e tθ
0 = ˆ θ(δ) ≡ ˆ θ and choose s =0 ; then by (6) and (8), ω(s;ˆ θ) ≡ w(0,·)=0 . By Lemma
2, α0(0) = 1 and, by Lemma 2 and σa(·|ˆ θ) continuous on (ˆ θ,¯ θ), α0(σc
a(ˆ θ)) = a =0 .W r i t i n gσc
0(ˆ θ)=ˆ s and
suppressing the arguments identifying post-school year strategies, the payoﬀst oˆ θ for using the respective




E(π)v(1 − ˆ θ˜ κ|1) (23)
and
u[ˆ s,0,w sep(ˆ θ;ˆ θ);ˆ θ]=v(1 − ˆ s|0) − c(ˆ s,ˆ θ)+
δ
1 − δ
[wsep(ˆ θ;ˆ θ)+v(1|0)]. (24)
If u[0,1,0;ˆ θ] <u [ˆ s,0,w sep(ˆ θ;ˆ θ);ˆ θ] then ˆ θ strictly prefers to separate and, by Lemma 3 and monotonicity of
payoﬀsi nt y p e ,u[0,1,0;θ] <u [σc
0(θ),0,w sep(θ;θ);θ] for all θ>ˆ θ. By Proposition 3, therefore, no D1 equi-
librium with accepted types pooling on s =0exists in this case. Suppose u[0,1,0;ˆ θ] ≥ u[ˆ s,0,w sep(ˆ θ;ˆ θ);ˆ θ].
If the weak inequality in fact holds with equality then, by monotonicity of payoﬀs in type, Propositions 1
and 4 imply (σ(·|ˆ θ),α 0) supports a D1 peer pressure equilibrium. Suppose the inequality holds strictly so,
conditional on other agents’ strategies, ˆ θ strictly prefers pooling on s =0and being accepted by the group
to separating on ˆ s and being rejected by the group.
By Lemma 1(2), for any θ
0 > ˆ θ, the expected discounted payoﬀ at t =0from pooling on s =0 ,e a r n i n g














with the inequality following from the deﬁnition of ˆ θ. Therefore, by continuity of E(π)v(1 − θ˜ κ|1) and
wsep(θ;ˆ θ) in θ,i fu[0,1,0;ˆ θ] >u [ˆ s,0,wsep(ˆ θ;ˆ θ);ˆ θ] then there exists an open interval of types I =( ˆ θ,ˆ θ+ ) ⊆
R(σ(·|ˆ θ),α 0) such that, for all θ ∈ I, u[0,1,0;θ] >u [σ0(θ|ˆ θ),0,wsep(θ;ˆ θ);θ]. Holding s =0ﬁxed for the
pooling set of types, consider an educational investment strategy, σ(·|θ
0) where ˆ θ<θ
0 < ˆ θ+ . Since investing
in no education implies a zero wage, conditional on α0(0) = 1 all types θ ∈ [0,ˆ θ] are indiﬀerent between
playing σ(θ|θ
0) or σ(θ|ˆ θ). And by deﬁnition of σ(·|θ
0) and θ




0);t h e r e f o r e ,b y
Lemma 4, θ





0|ˆ θ).B yd e ﬁnition of ˆ θ, F(ˆ θ|σ(θ|ˆ θ)=0 )=1 ;
31so by F smooth and Lemma 2, for θ
0 = ˆ θ + η with η>0 suﬃciently small, σ(θ|θ
0)=0implies α0(0) =
1. Consider an increasing sequence of educational investment strategies {σ(·|θn)}
θ∞=¯ θ
θ0=ˆ θ . By the preceding
remarks, wages are constant at zero on the pooling segment and wsep(θn;θn) is strictly increasing in θn along
the sequence and, for all n, α0(σ(θ|θn)) = 1 only if σ(θ|θn)=0 .D e ﬁne the diﬀerence
∆(θn) ≡ u[0,1,0;θn] − u[σc
0(θn),0,w sep(θn;θn);θn].
Doing the calculus and taking account of the deﬁnition of σc
0(θn) as the complete information optimal decision
for θn conditional on being excluded from the group, it is straightforward to conﬁrm that ∆(θn) is strictly
decreasing in θn. There are two possibilities: either ∆(θn)=0for some θn ∈ (ˆ θ,θ
#],w h e r eθ
# is deﬁned by
F(ˆ θ|σ(θ|θ
#)=0 )=F0 < 1;o r∆(θn) > 0 at θn = θ
#.I nt h eﬁrst case Proposition 4 implies the strategies
(σ(·|θn),α 0) support a D1 peer pressure equilibrium. Consider the second case. By Lemma 2 and deﬁnition
of θ
#, the group is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting any individual choosing σ(θ|θ





















By payoﬀ monotonicity, given the mixed response to s =0all types θ>θ





#) than to pool on s =0 . And since educational investment cannot be negative,
no type θ<θ




#)) is believed by the group to be sent by θ
# > ˆ θ and so induces sure rejection by the group.
Therefore no type can make a proﬁtable deviation and the strategies again support a D1 equilibrium. This
completes the ﬁrst step of the argument; it remains to show there exists some δ1 ∈ (0,1) such that ˆ θ(δ)
weakly prefers pooling on s =0to separating with σc
0(ˆ θ(δ)|ˆ θ(δ)) if and only if δ ≤ δ1.
Assume the strategy σ(·|ˆ θ(δ)) is to be played with pooling on s =0 .T h e n
u[0,1,0;ˆ θ(δ)] = v(1|1) +
δ
1 − δ





E(π)v(1 − ˆ θ(δ)˜ κ|1)
[1 − δ]2 −
δ
1 − δ
∂v(1 − ˆ θ(δ)k|1)
∂l
(1 − π)kˆ θ
0
(δ). (25)
Similarly let s(ˆ θ(δ),δ) ≡ σc
0(ˆ θ(δ)) and [ˆ v − ˆ c](δ) ≡ [v(1 − s(ˆ θ(δ),δ)|0) − c(s(ˆ θ(δ),δ),ˆ θ(δ))],s o
u[σc
0(ˆ θ(δ)),0,w sep(ˆ θ(δ);ˆ θ(δ));ˆ θ(δ)] =
[ˆ v − ˆ c](δ)+
δ
1 − δ
[y(s(ˆ θ(δ),δ),ˆ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)]
32and, by the Envelope Theorem,
du[σc















y(·,ˆ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)
[1 − δ]2 . (26)
By (15), limδ↓0 ˆ θ(δ)=0 . Hence
lim
δ↓0
∆(ˆ θ(δ)) = u[0,1,0;0] − u[σc
0(0),0,w sep(0;0);0]
= v(1|1) − v(1|0) > 0. (27)






















(1 − δ)[ˆ v − ˆ c]+δ[y(s(ˆ θ(δ),δ),ˆ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)]
i
,
(15) and ˆ θ(δ) < 1/k imply limδ↑1 ∆(ˆ θ(δ)) < 0. Therefore, by continuity there exists at least one δ<1 at
which ∆(ˆ θ(δ)) = 0.L e tδ1 denote any value in (0,1) at which ∆(ˆ θ(δ)) = 0. Consider the diﬀerence
∆δ1 =
du[σc





























E(π)v(1 − ˆ θ(δ1)˜ κ|1) − (y(·,ˆ θ(δ1)) + v(1|0))
i
.
By deﬁnition, ∆(ˆ θ(δ1)) = 0 so the RHS of the preceding inequality is strictly negative, and the maintained
assumptions imply the LHS of the inequality is strictly positive. Therefore, (27) and continuity imply there
can exist at most one value of δ ∈ (0,1) at which ∆(ˆ θ(δ)) = 0. Setting this value equal to δ1 then proves the
suﬃciency part of the Proposition.
(Necessity) To establish the necessity claim, assume δ>δ 1. By the argument for Suﬃciency, there is
no D1 equilibrium in which σ(θ|θ
0)=0for all θ ≤ θ
0 ∈ [ˆ θ(δ),¯ θ). Therefore, if there is a D1 peer pressure
equilibrium at δ, there must exist some educational investment eﬀort s0 such that: (i) for all θ ≤ ˆ θ(δ),
σ(θ|ˆ θ(δ)) = s0 > 0; (ii) ˆ θ(δ) weakly prefers choosing s0 to the separating investment level σc
0(ˆ θ(δ));a n d(iii)
the lowest type, θ =0 , weakly prefers choosing s0 to choosing any smaller educational eﬀort. Noting that
assumptions on F insure ω(s0;θ
0) is increasing in θ
0, Properties (i) and (ii) follow from the same reasoning
as for the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h eS u ﬃciency argument, with pooling on s0 rather than on zero; to see why (iii)
33must hold, suppose all types θ ∈ (0,ˆ θ(δ)] pool on σ(θ|ˆ θ(δ)) = s0 and θ =0deviates to any educational
investment level s<s 0. Such a deviation constitutes an out-of-equilibrium message and, by monotonicity,
D1 requires the ﬁrms’ and the group’s beliefs about the type sending the message to be concentrated on the
lowest type. Hence, (6) and (8) imply the wage induced by such a deviation is y(s,0) <ω (s0;ˆ θ(δ)),a n d
Lemma 2 implies the group surely accepts θ =0consequent on observing the deviation. So if θ =0strictly
prefers to separate at some s<s 0, then pooling on s0 for the accepted set of types is untenable in any D1
peer pressure equilibrium. Therefore, D1 equilibria exist at δ only if there is some s0 such that (i) holds
and, for all s ∈ [0,s 0),
v(1 − s0|1) − c(s0,0) +
δ
1 − δ
[ω(s0;ˆ θ(δ)) + v(1|1)]





v(1 − s0|1) − c(s0,ˆ θ(δ)) +
δ
1 − δ
[ω(s0;ˆ θ(δ)) + E(π)v(1 − ˆ θ(δ)˜ κ|1)]
≥ v(1 − σc
0(ˆ θ(δ))|0) − c(σc
0(ˆ θ(δ)),ˆ θ(δ)) +
δ
1 − δ
[wsep(ˆ θ(δ);ˆ θ(δ)) + v(1|0)].




[v(1 − s|1) − c(s,0) − v(1 − s0|1) + c(s0,0)] + y(s;0); (28)
and




0(ˆ θ(δ))|0) − c(σc
0(ˆ θ(δ)),ˆ θ(δ)) − v(1 − s0|1) + c(s0,ˆ θ(δ))]. (29)
Suppose there exists an investment level s0 > 0 at δ = δ1 such that both (28) and (29) obtain, and let δ → 1
holding s0 ﬁxed. From Lemma 1, ˆ θ(δ) is strictly increasing in δ on (0,1) with limδ↑1 ˆ θ(δ) < ∞. Hence,
ω(s0;ˆ θ(δ)) is nondecreasing in δ, limδ↑1 ω(s0;ˆ θ(δ)) ≥ ω(s0;ˆ θ(δ1)), and (28) continues to hold as we proceed
to the limit. Consider (29). By Lemma 1, ˆ θ(δ) < 1/k for all δ<1. Therefore, since every term in the square
brackets on RHS(29) is ﬁnite under the maintained assumptions, limδ↑1 RHS(29) ≥ 0.B u tσc
0(ˆ θ(δ)) >s 0
for all δ ∈ [δ1,1),s oω(s0;ˆ θ(δ)) <w sep(ˆ θ(δ);ˆ θ(δ)) all δ ∈ [δ1,1) which implies
lim
δ→1
[ω(s0;ˆ θ(δ)) − wsep(ˆ θ(δ);ˆ θ(δ))] < 0.
Hence, (29) cannot hold for δ suﬃciently high. Therefore, if both (28) and (29) hold at δ = δ1 for s0 > 0,
there must exist some δ2 ∈ (δ1,1) such that (29) fails at every δ>δ 2. This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6 This proposition is proved by the argument for the Suﬃciency claim of Proposition
5. ¤
34Proof of Proposition 7 Given the separating assumption on the restriction of σ∗ to R(σ∗,α ∗
0),P r o p o s i t i o n
3(3) says inf R(σ∗,α ∗
0) ≡ θ
∗ ≥ ˆ θ(δ) and Proposition 3(2) implies there must be a pooling segment (θ1,θ
∗)
on which σ∗ is constant. If θ1 ≥ ˆ θ(δ) then Lemma 2 and sequential rationality imply α∗
0(σ∗(θ)) = 0,
contradicting θ
∗ =i n fR(σ∗,α ∗
0);s oθ1 < ˆ θ(δ;10).A n di fθ1 =0then the equilibrium would satisfy the D1
reﬁnement, contradicting δ>δ 1 by Proposition 4. Because Lemma 3 and θ1 > 0 give σ∗(θ) ∈ (0,σc
0(θ
∗)) for
all θ ∈ (θ1,θ
∗), these facts establish claim (1). Claim (2) simply exhausts the possibilities for any equilibrium
behaviors on the segment [0,θ1). ¤
Proof of Corollary 1 The claim follows directly from Proposition 3(2), Proposition 3(3) and the deﬁnition
of ˆ θ(δ) a st h et y pej u s ti n d i ﬀerent between remaining in the group and contributing for all κt, and contributing
to the group only if κt =0 . ¤
Proof of Proposition 8 The strategy [T1] is easily seen to be a best response to [T2] for the post-school
years. So ﬁx [T1] and consider an individual group member θ asked to contribute k>0 in period t ≥ 1
(trivially, if κt =0 , θ’s best response is τ(0,θ)=dt =1 ). The discounted expected values to θ from
contributing k and from stating she will contribute, being accepted, and reneging on her statement, are
given by expressions (12) and (13), respectively, above. That is, θ is indiﬀerent between always contributing
k, and only claiming an intention to contribute, but in fact reneging on her claim once accepted by the group
in the period, iﬀ θ = ˆ θ(δ) as deﬁned earlier. On the other hand, θ’s expected discounted payoﬀ under [T1]
from stating she will not contribute k in period t (but only contribute when κt =0 ), is
w + v(j|0) +
δ
1 − δ
[w + πv(j|1) + (1 − π)v(j|0)].
Hence, under [T1],t h ed i ﬀerence between the payoﬀ from stating an intention to contribute and reneging,












[πv(j|1) + (1 − π)v(j|0)]
¸
.
Collecting terms this diﬀerence is nonpositive if and only if δ ≥ 1/[1 + π]. Therefore, given this inequality,
all types prefer to be honest about their intentions to contribute and so be accepted by the group whenever
they propose to contribute, to dissembling when the required contribution is high and reaping the one period
gain from the deception. Now by deﬁnition, θ
T i st h et y p ei n d i ﬀerent between always contributing and only
contributing at low cost, κt =0 . From (12), at any wage the expected payoﬀ from always contributing is
strictly decreasing in θ. It follows that δ ≥ 1/[1 + π] implies θ
T ≤ ˆ θ(δ) and [T2] describes the best response
to [T1].
If δ<1/[1+π] then θ
T > ˆ θ(δ) and all types θ>ˆ θ(δ) strictly prefer to lie about their intent to contribute
k in any period, in which case [T1] and [T2] cannot constitute equilibrium strategies.
Since only types θ ≤ θ
T always contribute under [T1] and [T2], the tolerant group’s expected payoﬀ from










35Thus accepting all individuals is rational if and only F(θ
T|σ(θ)) ≥ 0, which is trivially the case.
Assume there exists a tolerant equilibrium. Then because all types are accepted by the group in the
school years irrespective of their educational investment, and all types strictly prefer to be honest regarding
group contributions in the post-school years, there is no incentive induced by [T1] for an individual to conceal
his or her true type from the group. Consequently, given all types are accepted, the separating result follows
from the standard existence argument for the Spence job-market signaling game. And since the tolerant
group’s expected payoﬀ conditional on accepting θ is no smaller than πb/(1−πγ), accepting all types in the
school years is a best response here. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9From the argument for Lemma 2, above, conditional on accepting θ, the average




+[ 1− F(ˆ θ(δ)|σ(θ))]
[πb− (1 − π)Bk]
1 − πγ
.
And since only types θ ≤ θ
T always contribute under [T1] and [T2], the tolerant group’s average expected










Taking the diﬀerence between these two values gives the result. ¤
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